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On May 10 my colleague Miguel Maduro and I presented a policy report at a 3-hour High Level Policy Seminar at
the EUI in Florence on the Democratic Governance of the Euro, in which the Commission President Barroso was an
active participant.  The event itself took place under Chatham House Rules, so the following will not say anything
about positions taken by participants and merely elaborate on two core points that were featured in the report and
that were the focal point of discussion, in the hope that these points might also be of interest to readers of the
Verfassungsblog. (The report itself, co-authored by Miguel Maduro, Bruno de Witte and myself, was the result of
collaboration of an international group of economists, political scientists and lawyers that formed a working group
under the auspices of the Global Governance Center at the EUI.)
The European financial crisis is not just a technical crisis and it will not be resolved a few Council agreements and
technical fixes. It raises profound political questions that affect the future of the European Union as a whole. At the
heart of the crisis are democratic problems. The crisis is in part the result of democratic failures of the states that the
EU needs to help correct. The financial troubles of a few states – in part the unintended consequences of seizing
opportunities provided by the internal market – became a problem for all.   Furthermore the problem of effectively
regulating highly mobile players in capital markets, to ensure that their activities do not burden outsiders with
inexorable costs – a democratic problem that can not be effectively solved on the level of Member States –  has
resulted in significantly worsening state budgetary situations, as banks effectively socialized risks and privatized
profits. Any European attempts to institutionally address these highly contentious issues, which will inevitably have
considerably distributive effects, will itself have to rely on the kind of political capital that only robust forms of
democratic legitimation can provide. So what can be done to address these problems? There are two things that
could happen on the EU level that would go some way to address these concerns. Both are possible within the
parameters of the existing constitutional framework and do not require Treaty changes.
Electoral choice, and why it matters
First, it is high time to be serious about proposals endorsed among others by current President of the European
Parliament Martin Schulz and Wolfgang Schäuble to make the elections for the European Parliament genuine
European elections for the choice of the President of the European executive. For this to happen, it would be
sufficient for the different European political groups to present competing candidates before the next election. If the
election campaign would focus on this, the European Council would, in practice, have to appoint the winning
candidate. Such a shift is of fundamental importance and the reasons sometime invoked against it are not
persuasive.
It is of fundamental importance, because we should not be surprised to see that European citizens disagree about
the  kind of  policy measures that are the best response to the financial crisis and other political issues that the EU
rightly addresses through legislation. It is a mistake to insist, as national politicians invariably do, when they defend
the measures taken at late night Council meetings under the current regime of executive dominated
intergovermentalism, that there is no alternative to the decision they have made. For many citizens that is the
reason why they turn their back on Europe: They do not like the policy choices generated on the European level,
and there is no alternative personnel and menu of policy options present to engage with on the European level, so
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they associate Europe with those policy choices they deem undesirable. If faced with a genuine choice in
personnel, programmes and policies, disgruntled citizens  would be able to articulate their dissent not by turning
away from Europe and seeking refuge in populist recipes. They might instead, as European citizens, vote or
mobilize for an alternative Europe, personified in a different President, committed to different policies. Tying the
outcome of the European elections to the determination who will be the next Commission President will lead not only
to a surge of interest in European parliamentary elections and allow the Commission to more effectively fulfil the
functions assigned to it, it is also likely to be the best antidote to the spread of nationalist populism and
Euroscepticism.
Furthermore under the Fiscal Treaty and other fiscal crisis related legislation like the six-pack the Commission gains
considerable powers to intervene in the budgetary processes of Member States, once they have shown themselves
unable to meet the strict budgetary requirements imposed on them.  For those powers and the discretion that comes
with these powers to be exercised effectively and legitimately, the Commission must be able to rely on the kind of
legitimacy that comes with direct link to the outcome of European elections.  Budgetary questions were at the heart
of the historical parliamentary struggles for control over a democratically  unaccountable executive – they are the
inner sanctum of parliamentary prerogatives – and it is unlikely that national Parliaments will give much weight to a
Commission that is seen as the instrument of the collective executives of Member States.
The arguments against such elections are ultimately not persuasive. The current role of the national executives in
the European decision-making process is not something that enhances the democratic legitimacy of that process. It
is the result of the executive branches having captured the European decision-making process, with the
accountability to national parliaments, even though not without significance, ultimately limited for structural reasons.
The claim that small Member States would lose too much influence is also misguided. On the contrary, a stronger
Commission President might be a more plausible counterweight to the tendency of two or three large states
effectively dominating the decision-making process in Europe. The claim that European elections cannot be
meaningful, because European citizens are just not interested in European elections, that there are no genuine
European parties and there is no robust European public sphere etc. gets it the wrong way around. The issue is one
of sequencing: Only once European elections are appropriately structured to allow citizens to choose between
different leadership personnel, programs and policies are the incentives in place to develop an interest in elections,
to restructure parties around European agendas and to have the media focus more strongly on European themes.
Taming the Forces of the Financial Markets
Second,  the European Union can increase its democratic legitimacy by more closely  aligning its policy priorities to
the problems that, given the ineffectiveness of Member State solutions, it should address. The European Union is
widely believed to be an institution that enables Member States collectively to reap the benefits of greater market
integration, both on the European and global level, while at the same time ensuring political control over markets to
ensure through appropriate regulation that mobile market actors cannot exploit the freedoms offered by
transnational markets to undermine public goods.
The financial crisis has illustrated clearly that financial institutions have not been regulated sufficiently to ensure that
the highly dynamic global financial markets effectively serve as the infrastructure of a stable market economy. To a
large extent the so-called sovereign debt crisis is just a knock-on crisis to the 2008 financial crisis, as the example of
Ireland and Spain illustrate. Meanwhile financial institutions, often bolstered by paid-for economic expertise that
invokes models in which the enormity of the social costs of the financial crisis never seems to register, have
emphasized not only the inefficiency but also the ineffectiveness of regulations that burden or restrict financial
transactions, in part invoking global competition and exit options in globalized financial markets.
This is the type of blackmail that challenges the European Union to prove that it can actually do what it has
promised: To make use of Europe’s considerable regulatory capacities and market clout to tame the forces
empowered by otherwise unfettered global markets. There is no reason why Europe should not follow through on
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this: The enhanced cooperation procedure can be used to overcome the lack of consensus among Member States,
and an aggressive interpretation of the jurisdiction of the EU can ensure that exit options are effectively closed or
minimalized.
Furthermore, the EU should provide incentives for other states to also adopt similar rules, effectively creating
incentives for global harmonization. If, for example, a harmonized tax on financial transactions were to be
earmarked to reduce a Member States contribution to the EU or if, for a non Member State, a similar tax on
transactions involving a closer link with that state would qualify for an EU tax credit, there would be an incentive for
originally disinclined states to also adopt similar taxes, and taxed financial institutions would have little incentive to
lobby against it in that state, given that they would have to pay the tax in Europe anyway.
The point here is not to push for any particular mechanisms to ensure that financial institutions fulfil their function as
an integral part of the infrastructure of a market economy. The point is to highlight the responsibilities and
possibilities of the EU to effectively play the role of a regional regulator and global leader in the regulation of highly
mobile market actors such as financial institutions that can not effectively be regulated by Member States. That is
what the EU has claimed to be able to do and that is what it needs to be seen to do, if it wants to strengthen its
democratic credentials.
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